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SERVICE OF PROCESS AND THE MILITARY
 W. Mark C. Weidemaier
This bulletin addresses service of process on members of the United States Armed Forces and
civilians located on military property. Absent service of process, of course, or a statutory
exemption to service, the court lacks jurisdiction to enter a judgment against the defendant.1
But while fairly routine in most cases, service may be complicated by a defendant’s presence
on a U.S. military installation, on a military ship in U.S. or foreign waters, or on a base in a
foreign country.
Consider a lawsuit against a servicemember who recently has been mobilized for duty
and who is currently undergoing in-processing at Fort Bragg before deployment overseas.
May the sheriff leave a copy of the summons and complaint with the defendant’s spouse or
partner at the defendant’s former civilian address? If not, and the plaintiff must serve the
defendant at Fort Bragg or, worse, at a duty station overseas, what methods of service are
available?
This dilemma is not an uncommon one, as members of the Armed Forces may become
involved in litigation to the same extent as civilians. In 2001, for example, the Army Legal
Assistance Offices reportedly assisted more than 29,000 servicemembers with divorce-related
issues.2 Litigation involving servicemembers, of course, is not limited to domestic law

1. See, e.g., G.S. § 1-75.3; Freeman v. Freeman, 155 N.C. App. 603, 606, 573 S.E.2d 708, 711
(2002) (noting need to obtain jurisdiction by service or by method prescribed by statute); First Union
Nat’l Bank v. Rolfe, 83 N.C. App. 625, 628, 351 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1986) (noting constitutional
“mandate[] that a party be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before he can be deprived of a
legal claim or defense”).
2. See Maj. Wendy P. Daknis, Home Sweet Home: A Practical Approach to Domicile, 177 Mil.
L. Rev. 49, 62 n.75 (2003); see also Maj. Alan L. Cook, The Armed Forces as a Model Employer in
Child Support Enforcement: A Proposal to Improve Service of Process on Military Members, 155 Mil.
L. Rev. 153, 153-54 & nn. 4-6 (1998) (noting varying estimates that the federal government, and
primarily the Department of Defense, employed up to 100,000 parents who were in arrears on child
support obligations).
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matters.3 Moreover, servicemembers’ family members
and dependents, as well as civilian employees, may
work or live on military installations and become
involved with the court system. This bulletin will refer
to all such persons as “servicemembers” or “members
of the Armed Forces,” except where there is reason to
distinguish between servicemembers and civilians.

respect to conduct occurring on a military installation.6
Moreover, although the bulletin discusses service of
process on members of the Armed Forces located
outside the United States, readers interested in a more
thorough discussion of international service should
review Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/07,
International Service of Process Under the Hague
Convention (2004).7

The methods a plaintiff may use to serve a
member of the Armed Forces vary depending on a
number of factors. These factors include, among
others, the location of the relevant military installation;
the location of the court that issued the service papers;
the nature of federal jurisdiction over the installation;
any unique policies implemented by the relevant
branch of service; and, if the servicemember is
stationed overseas, the effect of any applicable
international law and agreements, such as the
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters, also known as the Hague Convention.4

General rules governing service of
process on members of the Armed
Forces
The rules governing service of process on civilian
litigants apply to members of the Armed Forces as
well.8 Any difficulty in accomplishing service,
therefore, arises not from the fact that the defendant is
a servicemember but from the control exercised by the
federal government over military installations. So, for
example, an off-base servicemember is subject to
personal service to the same extent as any other
litigant.9

This bulletin provides an overview of service of
state court process on members of the Armed Forces.
It focuses on litigation involving servicemembers in
their individual capacities, rather than litigation
resulting from the exercise of official duties or lawsuits
purporting to name the United States or a specific
branch of the military as a defendant.5 Nor does the
bulletin address the separate, and often complex,
question of whether a state may enforce its laws with

6. That issue is beyond the scope of this bulletin but
generally depends on the nature of the federal government’s
legislative jurisdiction over the land in question. See, e.g.,
State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 161, 400 S.E.2d 405 (1991) (holding
that Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to try defendant as an
adult for crimes allegedly committed as a juvenile on the
Camp Lejeune military installation). For a brief discussion
of federal jurisdiction over property acquired from states, see
note 36, infra.
7. This bulletin also does not address the effect of the
Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 501 et
seq., which provides, among other things, for temporary
stays of judicial and administrative proceedings against
servicemembers on active duty. The Act does not affect the
manner in which members of the Armed Forces must be
served with process. See, e.g., Greco v. Renegades, Inc., 761
N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); McFadden v.
Shore, 60 F. Supp. 8, 9 (E.D. Pa. 1945).

3. See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Horak, 325 N.W.2d
134 (Minn. 1982) (suit against servicemember located in
West Germany based on alleged illegal purchase and supply
of liquor to minor involved in accident).
4. See Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Done at the Hague November 15, 1965 (entered into
force for the United States February 10, 1969), 20 U.S.T.
361; T.I.A.S. 6638; 658 U.N.T.S. 163; 28 U.S.C. (Appendix
following Fed. R. Civ. P. 4).

8. No provision of N.C.R.C.P. 4 distinguishes
between service on civilian litigants and members of the
Armed Forces.

5. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 516.10(a) (establishing
policy that Department of the Army “officials will not
prevent or evade the service of process in legal actions
brought against the United States or against themselves in
their official capacities”); 32 C.F.R. § 516.14 (“The Chief,
Litigation Division, shall accept service of process for
Department of the Army or for the Secretary of the Army in
his official capacity.”).

9. See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1)a; see also In re
Custody of Nugent, 955 P.2d 584, 586-87 (Colo. Ct. App.
1997) (holding that defendant had been properly served in
dissolution of marriage/custody action in Colorado when,
after repeated, failed attempts at service on military base in
Connecticut, defendant was personally served on visit to
Colorado). Likewise, in some, limited circumstances, a
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contrast, refers to “a person’s true, fixed, principal, and
permanent home, to which that person intends to return
and remain even though currently residing
elsewhere.”13 An adult establishes a domicile by being
physically present in a place he or she intends to
remain,14 and may retain that domicile even when
residing elsewhere:

Because members of the Armed Forces must be
served in the same manner as any other party, the
question arises whether they are subject to substituted
personal service at a former civilian residence. This
bulletin first addresses this question before turning to
the mechanics of serving process on military property.

To effect a change of domicile, there must be
an actual abandonment of the first domicile,
coupled with an intention not to return to it,
and there must be a new domicile acquired by
actual residence within another jurisdiction,
coupled with the intention of making the lastacquired residence a permanent home.15

Substituted personal service on members
of the Armed Forces
North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(1)a
authorizes service by “leaving copies [of the summons
and complaint] at the defendant's dwelling house or
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein.”10 Does this rule
authorize the sheriff to leave service papers with
someone at the servicemember’s civilian residence,
even though the servicemember now resides on a
military installation in the U.S. or abroad?11

A number of courts have interpreted “usual place
of abode,” “dwelling house,” or similar terms to mean
something akin to “domicile.”16 Under such an
interpretation, after a servicemember establishes a
domicile at a civilian residence, he or she may be
served there after being called to duty unless the
evidence shows a change of domicile – i.e., that the
servicemember did not intend to return and intended to
make a permanent home in his or her new place of
residence.

The answer depends on whether the terms
“dwelling house” and “usual place of abode” in Rule
4(j)(1) refer to the servicemember’s domicile or, more
broadly, to his or her residence. The term “[r]esidence
simply indicates a person’s actual place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary.”12 “Domicile,” by

A greater number of courts, however, interpret the
terms “usual place of abode” and “dwelling house” by
engaging in “a practical inquiry as to where the
defendant is actually living.”17 These courts construe

member of the Armed Forces might be subject to service by
publication. See G.S. §1A-1, Rule 4(j1) (authorizing such
service when a party “cannot with due diligence be served by
personal delivery, registered or certified mail, or by a
designated delivery service”).

13. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 501 (8th ed. 2004).

10. G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1)a. The “person of suitable
age and discretion” must reside at the defendant’s “dwelling
house” or “usual place of abode” at the time the summons
and complaint are delivered. See Guthrie v. Ray, 293 N.C.
67, 70, 235 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1977).

14. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989); Hall, 280 N.C. at 605-06,
187 S.E.2d at 55 (“Two things must concur to constitute a
domicile: First, residence; second, the intent to make the
place of residence a home.”).

11. If Rule 4(j)(1)a authorizes this manner of service,
and if it is consistent with due process (a topic discussed
briefly below), substituted personal service might be
available even if the servicemember was stationed overseas.
See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S.
694, 700 (1988) (holding that forum law determines whether
service on a party located overseas requires the “transmittal”
of documents abroad and is thus subject to the Hague
Convention).

15. Reynolds v. Lloyd Cotton Mills, 177 N.C. 412, 99
S.E. 240, 245 (1919).
16. See, e.g., McFadden v Shore, 60 F Supp 8, 9 (E.D.
Pa. 1945); Ruth & Clark, Inc. v Emery, 11 N.W.2d 397, 401
(Iowa 1943) (interpreting term “usual place of residence”).
17. Hysell v Murray, 28 F.R.D. 584, 588 (S.D. Iowa,
1961). These courts recognize that “[s]ervice with our armed
forces frequently results in a somewhat nomadic existence . .
. . Assignment to a station, camp or ship compels the
physical presence of military personnel at spots all over the
country, even the world, for fixed periods but does not
necessarily result in a change of their domicile.” King v.
Fisher, 117 A.2d 76, 77 (Del. Super. 1955).

12. Hall v. Wake County Bd. of Elections, 280 N.C.
600, 606, 187 S.E.2d 52, 55 (1972); see also BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1310 (8th ed. 2004) (listing, among definitions
of residence, “[t]he place where one actually lives” and “[a]
house or other fixed abode; a dwelling”).
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“usual place of abode” to mean “the place where a
person is physically residing for other than the narrow,
limited purpose of a vacation or other short, temporary
absence. . . . [I]t must be the place where the defendant
is usually to be found.”18 Accordingly, a
servicemember’s usual place of abode is “the military
installation where he is stationed, regardless of
whether he is married or intends to return to his former
residence at the conclusion of military service.”19
Unless it appears that the servicemember is only
temporarily absent from the civilian residence and is
actually likely to receive papers delivered there, these
courts require service to be made where the
servicemember actually resides.20

likely that the defendant will receive actual notice of
the action.

Rather than attempt precise definition, North
Carolina courts have analyzed whether a place is a
party’s dwelling house or usual place of abode “on the
facts of the particular case.”21 Their analysis has
yielded a definition that is “probably broad enough to
embrace any location inhabited by [the] defendant with
such frequency that his absence therefrom is only
temporary.”22 But the cases do not support the view
that a defendant’s “dwelling house” or “usual place of
abode” will always include the defendant’s domicile.
The fact that a servicemember remains domiciled at his
or her civilian residence, therefore, does not mean that
substituted service may always be made at that
address. Rather, as the following cases suggest,
substituted service will likely be valid only when made
on a suitable person at a place from which the
servicemember is only temporarily absent, and
therefore under circumstances where it is reasonably

18. Whetsel v. Gosnell, 181 A.2d 91, 94 (Del. 1962).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Neher v District Court for Fourth
Judicial Dist., 422 P.2d 627, 628 (Colo. 1967); Whetsel v
Gosnell, 181 A.2d 91, 94 (Del. 1962); Hysell, 28 F.R.D. at
588; James v Russell F. Davis, Inc., 163 F Supp 253, 256-57
(N.D. Ind. 1958); Booth v Crockett, 173 P.2d 647, 648-50
(Utah 1946); Kurilla v Roth, 38 A.2d 862, 863 (N.J. 1944).
21. Van Buren v. Glasco, 27 N.C. App. 1, 5, 217
S.E.2d 579, 582 (1975) (quotation omitted), overruled on
other grounds by Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 291 S.E.2d
141 (1982).
22. See G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil
Procedure § 4-13 (Michie, 2d ed. 1995). Note, too, that a
defendant may have more than one place of abode. See
Glasco, 27 N.C. App. at 6, 217 S.E.2d at 582.

•

In Gibbey v. Lindsey, 149 N.C. App. 470,
560 S.E.2d 589 (2002), the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Superior Court’s refusal to set
aside a default judgment entered against a
defendant in a wrongful death case. The
sheriff had left a copy of the summons and
complaint at the residence of defendant’s
mother, with whom defendant had formerly
lived. The defendant had left his mother’s
home several weeks previously to stay with
relatives in South Carolina. Nevertheless the
Court of Appeals held that the defendant
failed to present clear and unequivocal
evidence of improper service, noting that the
defendant left without telling his mother
where he was going, left most of his
possessions behind, considered his mother’s
residence his “home,” and had no intention of
staying in South Carolina “for any length of
time.” Id. at 473, 560 S.E.2d at 592. The
defendant’s mother also testified that, at the
time of service, “her home was Defendant’s
primary residence.” Id. at 473, 560 S.E.2d at
592.

•

In Van Buren v. Glasco, 27 N.C. App. 1, 217
S.E.2d 579 (1975),23 the Court of Appeals
again affirmed a Superior Court’s refusal to
set aside a default judgment. The sheriff had
left a copy of the summons and complaint
with the defendant’s fifteen year old son at a
house in North Carolina owned jointly by the
defendant and his wife. Although the
defendant had been working and living in
South Carolina for more than a year –
residing in another house owned jointly with
his wife – the defendant’s wife and son lived
at the North Carolina home, and defendant
returned home from South Carolina on the
“frequently recurring basis” of at least twice a
month. The Court of Appeals held that “when
all of the circumstances are considered,
[defendant’s] relationship and connection
with the North Carolina dwelling were such
that there was a reasonable probability that
substitute service of process at that dwelling
would, as it in fact here did, inform him of the

23. Van Buren was overruled on other grounds by Love
v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 291 S.E.2d 141 (1982).

4

December 2004

Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/08

proceedings against him in apt time to permit
him to assert in timely fashion such defenses
as he might have.” Id. at 6, 217 S.E.2d at 582
(emphasis added). In addition, the Court
noted, but did not decide, that the defendant’s
South Carolina residence might also qualify
as a “dwelling house or usual place of abode.”
•

much less one deployed overseas. They suggest,
however, that substituted service at a civilian residence
will be valid only if there is a reasonable probability
that the defendant will receive actual and timely notice
of the action.25 Such a rule is consistent with the
purpose of the service requirement, which is “to
provide the party with notice and allow him an
opportunity to answer or plead otherwise.”26

In Sink v. Easter, 284 N.C. 555, 202 S.E.2d
138 (1974), the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that a defendant who was
temporarily out of the country was not subject
to service of process by publication, because
the plaintiff could have effected substituted
service at the defendant’s North Carolina
residence. The sheriff had attempted to serve
the defendant at his residence in Guilford
County, but had returned the summons and
complaint unserved with a notation indicating
that the defendant was in Amsterdam at an
unknown address. The plaintiff’s attorney
also submitted an affidavit stating that he had
contacted someone at the defendant’s
residence, who had not known how long the
defendant would remain in Europe. The
defendant returned from Europe
approximately one month later. Without
extensive discussion, the Court concluded that
“plaintiff could have and therefore should
have effected” substituted personal service.
See id. at 141, 202 S.E.2d at 558. There
appeared to be no dispute, however, that the
defendant in fact resided in North Carolina at
the time of service and intended to return.24

Returning, then, to the example used at the
beginning of this bulletin – in which a recentlymobilized defendant is stationed at Fort Bragg and
awaiting deployment overseas – may the process
server leave service papers with the defendant’s spouse
or partner at the defendant’s former civilian residence?
The North Carolina case law suggests that the answer
is “no,” unless the defendant is only temporarily absent
and is likely to receive actual notice of the action.
Moreover, constitutional due process may also
require the plaintiff to utilize another means of service.
Due process entitles defendants to “notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
[them] of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections.”27 “The
means employed must be such as one desirous of
actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it.”28 It is likely that substituted
personal service at a civilian residence would fall short
of this standard in at least some cases, particularly if
the servicemember is deployed overseas or has
minimal contact with the person to whom the
summons and complaint are delivered.
Whether a plaintiff’s chosen service method
satisfies due process may also depend on whether the
plaintiff neglected to use other methods that would
have been more likely to provide actual and timely

None of these cases involves service on a member
of the Armed Forces residing on a military installation,
24. See also Guthrie v. Ray, 293 N.C. 67, 71-73, 235
S.E.2d 146, 149-50 (1977) (holding that trial court properly
refused to set aside default judgment entered against
defendant where sheriff’s return indicated that service had
been made by leaving copy of summons and complaint with
defendant’s mother at defendant’s and her dwelling house.
Although defendant submitted affidavit stating that he had
resided in another state for almost thirty years, Court applied
the rule that a single affidavit is insufficient to overcome
presumption of proper service afforded sheriff’s return.);
Ryals v. Hall-Lane Moving and Storage Co., Inc., 122 N.C.
App. 242, 246-47, 468 S.E.2d 600, 603-04 (1996) (affirming
dismissal for lack of service where evidence showed that
defendants “resided” at address other than that at which
sheriff had left copy of summons and complaint).

25. See Glasco, 27 N.C. App. at 6, 217 S.E.2d at 582.
26. State ex rel. Desselberg v. Peele, 136 N.C. App.
206, 208, 523 S.E.2d 125, 127 (1999).
27 . Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (holding also that “[t]he notice
must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required
information and it must afford a reasonable time for those
interested to make their appearance”); see also McDonald’s
Corp. v. Dwyer, 338 N.C. 445, 448, 450 S.E.2d 888, 891
(1994) (noting same requirement under N.C. Constitution).
28. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
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notice.29 And with respect to members of the Armed
Forces, substituted personal service will rarely be the
only available service method. Indeed, when
compared to alternative service methods, substituted
service will sometimes be a decidedly inferior method
of providing notice. The remainder of this bulletin
discusses these alternative methods, under which
plaintiffs may serve members of the Armed Forces on
or off military reservations, including those outside the
United States.

Military policy requires servicemembers to provide
financial support to family members and to abide by
court orders governing such matters.32

Service of process on military
installations

Service on military installations within the
United States

Military authorities are not responsible for serving
process on members of the armed forces or civilians
working or residing on military installations.30 But
authorities can sometimes facilitate service, for
example by determining whether a servicemember will
voluntarily accept service or, in some cases, by
providing a location for the process server to wait and
ordering the servicemember to that location.31 In fact,
members of the Armed Forces may agree to accept
service with some frequency, especially in cases
involving child support or other family obligations.

Rule 4(j)(1) authorizes litigants to use a number of
service methods “within or without” North Carolina.34
For purposes of this bulletin, the most relevant service
methods are personal service (or substituted personal
service as discussed above) and service by registered
or certified mail, return receipt requested.35

If the plaintiff must formally serve a defendant on
military property, military regulations and policies
affect how, and whether, the plaintiff may do so.33
The following sections discuss the impact of those
policies on the service provisions of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure.

32. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 584.2 (Army regulation
requiring soldiers to provide financial support to family
members and to obey court orders regarding child custody);
32 C.F.R. § 733.3 (“All members of the naval service are
expected to conduct their personal affairs satisfactorily. This
includes the requirement that they provide adequate and
continuous support for their lawful dependents and comply
with the terms of separation agreements and court orders.
Failure to do so which tends to bring discredit on the naval
service is a proper subject of command consideration for
initiation of court-martial proceedings or other administrative
or disciplinary action.”).

29. See id. (“The reasonableness and hence the
constitutional validity of any chosen method may be
defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain
to inform those affected, or, where conditions do not
reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not
substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of
the feasible and customary substitutes.”) (citations omitted);
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 454 (1982) (“Of course, the
reasonableness of the notice provided must be tested with
reference to the existence of "feasible and customary"
alternatives and supplements to the form of notice chosen.”).

33. Service of process on U.S. military bases and ships
is governed by regulation. See 32 C.F.R. § 516 (Army
regulations); 32 C.F.R. § 720.20 (Navy and Marine Corps.
regulations).

30. The military has been unwilling to serve process,
in part due to a concern that providing such assistance to
civil litigants would violate the Posse Comitatus Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1385, which criminalizes “willfully us[ing] any part
of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or
otherwise to execute the laws.” See Cook, supra note 2 at
173 (noting historic concern of military that directly serving
process for state courts would violate Act).

34. See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1). The rule governs
service upon natural persons.
35. See id., Rule 4(j)(1)a & c. Rule 4(j)(1)b allows
delivery of the summons and complaint to an agent
authorized to accept service on behalf of the defendant. In
the past, the Armed Forces have considered designating
agents to receive service in child support cases on behalf of
servicemembers stationed overseas. See Exec. Order No.
12,953, 60 Fed. Reg. 11,013 § 402(a)(iv) (1995); see also
Cook, supra note 2 at 166-67 n. 94 & 205-211 (noting that
the Department of Defense recommended against the
designated agent proposal and evaluating due process
implications of proposal). To date, however, the Department

31. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 516.10 (providing that Army
officials asked to facilitate service of state process will
determine whether the defendant wishes to accept service);
32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a) (permitting Navy commanding
officers to order servicemembers to accept service from
courts located in the same state as the military installation).
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exercise some degree of legislative jurisdiction.38 This
is true for most, if not all, military installations in
North Carolina.39 On such property, Army regulations
require commanders first to determine whether the
servicemember wishes to accept service. 40 If the
servicemember declines, “the requesting party [is]
allowed to serve the process in accordance with
applicable state law, subject to reasonable restrictions
imposed by the commander.”41

Personal service on military installations
Litigants may be able to have members of the
Armed Forces personally served while on military
property, although the procedures are somewhat more
complicated than is the case off-base. Whether the
process server may gain access to the installation
depends in part on the nature of federal jurisdiction
over the property. On occasion, federal jurisdiction
may be exclusive to the point that state process may
not be served on the installation.36 In such cases,
military commanders will determine whether the
defendant will accept service, but if he or she refuses
to do so, the commander may deny the process server
access to the installation.37

Service on Navy installations proceeds in much
the same way. Navy and Marine Corps. regulations
require the commanding officer’s consent for service
on the installation but provide that “the command
ordinarily should not prevent service of process so
long as delivery is made in accordance with reasonable
command regulations and is consistent with good order
and discipline.”42 Commanders may designate a
location for service to occur and may order
servicemembers to that location.43 Civilians may be
invited to the designated location and, if they refuse,
the process server may be escorted to the civilian.44

In most cases, however, states reserve the right to
serve civil and criminal process on land acquired by
the federal government, and often reserve the right to
of Defense has declined to adopt this designated agent
approach.
36. Article I, § 8, cl. 17 of the United States
Constitution, permits Congress to “acquire derivative
legislative power from a State . . . by consensual acquisition
of land, or by nonconsensual acquisition followed by the
State’s subsequent cession of legislative authority over the
land.” Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542, (1976).
Federal jurisdiction over such property ranges from exclusive
(with no state legislative power, and possibly no right to
serve state process), to “concurrent, or partial, federal
legislative jurisdiction, which may allow the State to exercise
certain authority,” id., to mere proprietorial interests in the
land. See also G. Coggins & C. Wilkinson, FEDERAL PUBLIC
LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 172 (1987). In most cases,
however, states reserve the right to serve process even in
areas over which federal legislative jurisdiction is exclusive.
See, e.g., Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525,
533 (1885) (noting that such a reservation does not
“interfere[e] . . . with the supremacy of the United States
over [acquired lands], but . . . prevent[s] them from
becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice”).

The procedures are different, however, if the
military installation and the court that issued the
process are located in different states. In such cases,
military policy does not require servicemembers to
38. See Army Judge Advocate General Pub. AL JA
221, Law of Military Installations: Deskbook at 2-164 (Sept.
1, 1996) (“Virtually all State consent or cession laws
transferring exclusive or partial jurisdiction to the United
States reserve a right for State authorities to serve civil and
criminal process on the area covered.”).
39. See G.S. § 104-1 (authorizing United States to
acquire land, for specified purposes and in specified
amounts, but reserving right to serve process and to punish
violations of N.C. criminal law occurring on land); G.S. §
104-7 (consenting to acquisition of land for certain purposes
subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction but reserving right to
serve civil and criminal process of N.C. courts); State v.
Smith, 328 N.C. 161, 168, 400 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1991) (“It
appears that the State ceded all jurisdiction that it could
except for the service of process [on Camp Lejeune] and this
is what the United States accepted.”).

37. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 516.10(d)(1) (Army
regulation providing that, where servicemember will not
accept service, “the party requesting service will be notified
that the nature of the exclusive Federal jurisdiction precludes
service by state authorities”); 32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a)(1) (Navy
regulation applicable to process of state courts within the
state in which the base is located: “Withholding service may
be justified only in the rare case when the individual sought
is located in an area under exclusive Federal jurisdiction not
subject to any reservation by the State of the right to serve
process.”).

40. See 32 C.F.R. § 516.10(d)(2).
41. See id.
42. 32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a)(1).
43. See id.
44. See id. (also permitting civilians to be ordered to
leave classified areas to permit service).
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that a copy of the summons and complaint be delivered
to the defendant.49 A defendant’s refusal to accept
properly mailed documents, therefore, does not
necessarily invalidate service, particularly if the
defendant is aware that the documents are service
papers.50

accept service. If the servicemember declines to
accept service, military authorities may notify the
process server of the refusal and deny access to the
installation. This appears to be true for all branches of
the Armed Forces, with the possible exception of the
Air Force.45

Service by registered or certified mail.
Because it can be difficult or time consuming to gain
access to military facilities, plaintiffs sometimes
attempt to serve members of the Armed Forces by
mail. Rule 4(j)(1)c authorizes service by “registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to
the party to be served and deliver[ed] to the
addressee.”46 Proof that the summons and complaint
were properly mailed and delivered to the addressee
establishes proper service.47 (Note that slightly
different requirements, discussed below, may apply to
service by international mail on members of the Armed
Forces stationed overseas.)

Service on military installations outside the
United States
Plaintiffs may have more difficulty serving members
of the Armed Forces who are stationed overseas. The
following sections address procedures for serving
defendants located outside the United States and how
these procedures are affected by military policies
governing service of process.

If a servicemember refuses to accept documents
served by mail, military or postal authorities should
make a notation of the refusal and return the
documents to the sender.48 Rule 4(j)(1)c requires only

49. See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1)c (referring to
registered or certified mail service “by delivering to the
addressee”); G.S. § 1-75.10(4) (requiring proof that service
by registered or certified mail “was in fact received as
evidenced by the attached registry receipt or other evidence
satisfactory to the court of delivery to the addressee”).

45. Navy and Marine Corps. regulations specifically
allow servicemembers to refuse to accept process from outof-state courts. See 32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a)(2). Likewise,
Army regulations permit access to Army property only when
the state has reserved the right to serve process, in areas of
concurrent jurisdiction, and in areas where the federal
government has only a proprietary interest. See 32 C.F.R. §
516.10(d)(2). These criteria would presumably not be
satisfied in most cases involving process from an out-of-state
court. Air Force authorities may in some circumstances
allow access to military installations for the purpose of
serving out of state process. See Cook, supra note 2 at 172
n.123 (reporting that the “Air Force policy is more liberal”
with respect to process of out-of-state courts).

50. This bulletin does not discuss in detail whether a
defendant who refuses to accept service is nevertheless
subject to the jurisdiction of the court. Some courts,
however, deem service to be proper over a defendant who
refuses to accept documents he or she knows to be service
papers. See, e.g., Miltland Raleigh-Durham v. Mudie, 122
N.C. App. 168, 172, 468 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1996) (rejecting
due process challenge based on alleged failure to provide
pre-attachment notice and hearing where defendant refused
to accept service by mail at address he had given plaintiff);
see also Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, 124 N.C. App. 255, 263,
477 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1996) (affirming service on defendant
in Turkey, although plaintiff had not complied with formal
service requirements, in part because “[t]here is also some
evidence in the record to suggest that defendant refused to
accept service”); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Ridgedale Farms,
Civ. A. No. 87-1802, 1989 WL 12724 at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 8,
1989) (“It is generally held that one who is informed that
service of process is being attempted cannot avoid service by
physically refusing to accept a summons when it is offered to
him.”); Western Farmers Elec. Co-Op v. Stephenson, 873
P.2d 311, 313 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994) (making same point).
Of course, the fact that mail is returned as unclaimed (as
opposed to refused) does not necessarily demonstrate that it
was delivered to, and refused by, the addressee.

46. G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1)c. Rule 4(j)(1)d also
allows service by certain designated delivery services
authorized pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7502(f)(2).
47. See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j2)(2); G.S. § 1-75.10(4),
(5).
48. See 32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a)(2) (Navy regulation
requiring notation of refusal where servicemember or civilian
refuses to accept out-of-state process; Navy policy arguably
requires servicemembers to accept in-state process sent by
mail); see also United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail
Manual F010.4.6 at 409 (updated Sept. 2, 2004) (providing
that where addressee refuses to accept mail, document should
be endorsed “refused” and returned).
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Military policies governing service outside
the United States

Finally, Rule 4(j3)(3) allows the court to order service
by another method, provided no international
agreement prohibits the chosen method. In each case,
the manner of service must be reasonably calculated to
give notice to the defendant of the lawsuit.

Military policies governing service of process abroad
are generally similar to those that apply within the
United States in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction
where the state has not reserved the right to serve
process. Military authorities determine whether a
servicemember will accept service and will convey
documents to the servicemember if he or she agrees to
accept them. Absent voluntary acceptance, however,
military authorities generally play no further role.
Instead, they instruct the serving party to comply with
whatever procedures are established by the law of the
pertinent foreign country.51

Of these service mechanisms, service pursuant to
the Hague Convention and service by international
mail are by far the most common. The remainder of
this bulletin therefore focuses briefly on those
methods. Readers interested in a more detailed
treatment of these topics, and international service in
general, should review Administration of Justice
Bulletin No. 2004/07, International Service of Process
Under the Hague Convention (2004).

Methods of service of process abroad

Service of process under the Hague
Convention

Rule 4(j3) authorizes a number of methods for
effecting service “in a place not within the United
States.”52 These methods apply equally to all
defendants, regardless whether they are civilians living
overseas in private residences or members of the
Armed Forces residing on a military installation.

The Hague Convention is the primary “internationally
agreed means” of service. It applies in “civil and
commercial matters”53 whenever forum law requires
service documents to be transmitted abroad.54
Numerous countries (“Contracting States”) have
ratified or acceded to the Convention., including many
of the countries in which U.S. servicemembers are
likely to be stationed.55

Rule 4(j3) establishes three basic categories of
international service mechanisms. First, Rule 4(j3)(1)
directs litigants to use any “internationally agreed
means” of service, such as those authorized by the
Hague Convention. Second, if there is no
internationally agreed means of service, or if the
“applicable international agreement” allows other
service methods, Rule 4(j3)(2) authorizes service to be
made:
•

The Convention identifies several methods of
service that may be used in Contracting States.
Foremost among these methods is the Central
Authority mechanism, which obliges each Contracting
State to establish a Central Authority to receive and
execute requests for service originating from other

in a manner prescribed by the law of the
foreign country in an action in any of its
courts of general jurisdiction;

•

in a manner directed by the foreign authority
in response to a letter rogatory; or

•

unless prohibited by the law of the foreign
country, by personal delivery or any form of
mail requiring a signed receipt, if the mail is
addressed and dispatched by the clerk of court
to the party to be served.

53. United States practice has traditionally viewed all
non-criminal cases, including administrative proceedings, as
“civil or commercial matters.” See 17 I.L.M. 319 (1978)
(report to Secretary of State by U.S. delegate to the 1977
Special Commission); Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, 124 N.C.
App. 255, 263, 477 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1996) (looking to
Convention to determine validity of service in custody
action); Warzynski v. Empire Comfort Sys., Inc., 102 N.C.
App. 222, 401 S.E.2d 801 (1991) (product liability action).
54. Because the Convention applies only when
documents are transmitted abroad, it is inapplicable if forum
law permits service to be made in the United States (for
example by personal service made during a servicemember’s
visit to the state). See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988). Any method of service,
of course, must be consistent with due process. See Mullane,
339 U.S. at 314.

51. See 32 C.F.R. 516.12(c) (Army regulation
establishing policies for service of state court process outside
United States); 32 C.F.R. 516.13 (listing contact information
for those seeking assistance or information concerning
service of process overseas); 32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a)(2) (Navy
policies governing service of out-of-state process).

55. A list of these countries is attached as Table A.

52. G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3).
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Contracting States.56 Upon receiving a request for
service, the receiving State’s Central Authority may
serve the documents in several ways. First, it may
serve the documents “by a method prescribed by [the
receiving State’s] internal law for the service of
documents in domestic actions upon persons who are
within its territory.”57 Second, it may serve the
documents by any method requested by the serving
party and compatible with the receiving State’s law.58
Finally, it may informally deliver the documents to a
defendant willing to accept service.59 The receiving
State’s Central Authority will also return to the
applicant a certificate describing the method, time, and
place of service and identifying the person to whom
the document was delivered.60

depending on the Status of Forces agreement between
the United States and the country in which the military
installation is located, the foreign Central Authority
may not be entitled to enter the installation. In such
cases, the Central Authority may attempt service
outside the installation, but there is of course no
guarantee that it will succeed. Moreover, depending
on the applicable Status of Forces agreement, some
Central Authorities may decline to serve process
altogether on members of the Armed Forces.61
Because of these difficulties, many litigants
attempt to serve members of the Armed Forces via
international mail. The following section briefly
discusses the procedures governing this manner of
service, which arguably differ somewhat from those
applicable to cases involving litigants located in the
United States.

Members of the Armed Forces, like any party
located in a Contracting State, may be served via the
Central Authority mechanism. This method of service,
however, can be complex and time consuming even in
cases involving civilians with no ties to the military.
These problems can be compounded if service requires
access to U.S. military installations. For example,

Service via international mail
Article 10(a) of the Convention states: “Provided the
State of destination does not object, the present
Convention shall not interfere with . . . the freedom to
send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to
persons abroad.”62 This language has provoked a
disagreement among U.S courts. Some have
interpreted Article 10(a) narrowly to permit litigants to
send documents by international mail only after
serving process by another means.63 Others have
rejected this narrow interpretation and held that Article
10(a) permits service of process by international
mail.64

56. See Convention Art. 2 & 5.
57. See id. Art. 5(a). For this manner of service, the
Central Authority may require the document to be translated
into an official language of the receiving State.
58. See id. Art. 5(b).
59. See id. Art. 5.
60. See Convention Art. 6 (also requiring Central
Authority to explain why documents were not served, if
applicable). Other service methods identified by the
Convention include the following:
•

•

•

The North Carolina Court of Appeals has
approved international mail service on several
occasions and thus appears to follow the broader

In certain cases, the Convention authorizes
consular or diplomatic officials to effect service,
although U.S. law generally prohibits foreign
service officers from acting in this capacity. See
Convention Art. 8 & 9; 22 C.F.R. § 92.85.

61. See U.S. Dep’t of State Flyer, Service of Legal
Documents Abroad ¶ N (Sept. 2000)
<http://travel.state.gov/law/service_general.html> (last
visited Nov. 30, 2004).

The Convention also permits certain persons in the
originating State to effect service “directly through
the judicial officers, officials, or other competent
persons” of the receiving State. Each Contracting
State may object to this manner of service. See
Convention Art. 10(b), (c) & Art. 21.

62. Convention Art. 10(a).
63. See, e.g., Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. STORMAN ASIA
M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2002); Sardanis v.
Sumitomo Corp., 279 A.D.2d 225, 229 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001); Knapp v. Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A., 60 F. Supp. 2d
566, 573 (S.D. W.Va. 1999).

Contracting States may also enter into separate
agreements establishing additional service
mechanisms, see Convention Art. 11, although the
United States does not appear to be a party to any
such agreements.

64. See Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 802 (9th
Cir. 2004); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839-40 (2d
Cir. 1986); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d
460, 470-74 (D.N.J. 1998).
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interpretation of Article 10(a).65 Servicemembers
stationed overseas may therefore be served by mail in
most cases. The Convention, however, permits each
Contracting State to object to service by “postal
channels,”66 and a number of States have done so.67
Service by mail will generally be improper in countries
that have objected to Article 10(a).68

whenever the defendant is located in a country that has
not ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention.71
If the defendant is located in a Contracting State,
however, there is an argument that mail service may
take any form that satisfies due process. A detailed
treatment of this argument is beyond the scope of this
bulletin, but interested readers should refer to
Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/07,
International Service of Process Under the Hague
Convention (2004). The validity of this argument is
questionable, and, until the appellate courts provide
definitive guidance, a litigant who wishes to use the
mails to serve a party located in a Contracting State
would be prudent to comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.72

There remains the question of what procedures
govern mail service on a defendant located overseas.
Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2 authorizes mail service “in a place not
within the United States.”69 Unlike Rule 4(j)(1)c,
however, which makes litigants responsible for mail
service “within or without” North Carolina, Rule
4(j3)(2)c.2 requires service by “any form of mail
requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and
dispatched by the clerk of court to the party to be
served.”70 These procedures should be followed

In most cases, litigants should be able to prove
that service documents were delivered to the
defendant. The Department of Defense operates
Military Post Offices (MPOs) for military personnel
overseas or on ships where the U.S. Postal Service
does not operate.73 Military policy appears to require
MPO personnel to obtain the addressee’s signature

65. See Hayes v. Evergo Telephone Co., 100 N.C. App.
474, 479, 397 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1980); Warzynski, 102 N.C.
App. at 228, 401 S.E.2d at 805.
66. See Convention Art. 10 & 21.

more general applicability.”). Note, too, that Rule 4(j3)
requires proof of service by mail to include “an affidavit or
certificate of addressing and mailing by the clerk of court.”

67. These States include Argentina, Bulgaria, China,
Czech Republic, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Republic of San
Marino, Republic of South Korea, Slovak Republic, Sri
Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela. See
Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/07, International
Service of Process Under the Hague Convention (2004).

71. Rule 4(j3)(3) permits the court to order service by
any method “not prohibited by international agreement.”
This rule presumably authorizes the court to order service by
mail in a manner that does not comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.
See, e.g., Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 805-06; Levin v. Rush
Trading Co., 248 F. Supp. 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).

68. See, e.g., Shenouda v. Mehanna, 203 F.R.D. 166,
171 (D.N.J. 2001); Davies v. Jobs & Adverts Online, Gmbh,
94 F. Supp. 2d 719, 721 n.6 (E.D. Va. 2000); Lyman Steel
Corp. v. Ferrostaal Metals Corp., 747 F. Supp. 389, 399-400
(N.D. Ohio 1990); Dr. Ing. H.C.F. Porsche A.G. v. Superior
Court, 123 Cal.App.3d 755, 761-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
But see Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, 124 N.C. App. 255, 264,
477 S.E.2d 239, 244 (1996) (apparently upholding service by
mail in Turkey, which has objected to Article 10(a), but
limiting its holding to child custody cases in which the
defendant has actual notice of the action and the plaintiff
attempts in good faith to comply with the Convention).

72. The few North Carolina cases addressing
international mail service in Contracting States do not make
clear whether litigants must comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.
Compare Warzynski 102 N.C. App. at 228, 401 S.E.2d at 805
(evaluating service made under Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2) and Hocke
v. Hanyane, 118 N.C. App. 630, 632-34, 456 S.E.2d 858,
859-60 (1995) (same) with Hayes, 100 N.C. App. at 476, 397
S.E.2d at 327 (approving mail service as conforming to
Convention even though plaintiff, rather than clerk,
apparently mailed service papers). Proof of service under
Rule 4(j3) must include an affidavit or certificate of mailing
from the clerk of court, which arguably suggests that the
procedures of Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2 are mandatory in all cases.

69. See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3) (first paragraph).
70. G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2 (emphasis added).
Presumably, Rule 4(j)(1)c does not authorize international
mail service in a manner inconsistent with the more specific
provisions contained in Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2. Cf. Fowler v.
Valencourt, 334 N.C. 345, 349, 435 S.E.2d 530, 532 (1993)
(“Where one of two statutes might apply to the same
situation, the statute which deals more directly and
specifically with the situation controls over the statute of

73. See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Dir. 4525.6-M,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSTAL MANUAL at 17 (Aug. 15,
2002). Servicemembers in the Army or Air Force have
Army Post Office (APO) addresses, and members of the
Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine Corps. have Fleet Post
Office (FPO) addresses. See id.
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On some occasions, substituted personal service at the
servicemember’s former civilian residence may be
appropriate. More often, a plaintiff will have to resort
to personal service on military property. This manner
of service is often feasible if the court and the military
installation are located in the same state. The plaintiff
may also use an appropriate form of mail service,
whether the servicemember is stationed in the U.S. or
abroad. If a defendant is stationed abroad in a country
that does not permit service by mail, however, the
plaintiff may be required to use the Central Authority
mechanism established by the Hague Convention.76 In
each case, of course, the manner of service must be
reasonably calculated to inform the defendant of the
existence and nature of the action.

prior to delivering mail for which a return receipt has
been requested and to “return the receipt(s) promptly
to the source.”74 If a servicemember refuses to accept
certified or registered mail, MPO personnel should
endorse the document “refused” and return it to the
sender.75

Conclusion
Members of the Armed Forces, and civilians living or
working on military installations, are subject to the
same rules governing service of process as any other
litigant. Military policy and the extent of federal
control over military bases, however, affects the
method and availability of service in individual cases.

76. Other provisions of Rule 4(j3) may also authorize
service, such as Rule 4(j3)(3), which permits the Court to
order alternative service methods. Again, readers interested
in a fuller treatment of international service should review
Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/07, International
Service of Process Under the Hague Convention (2004).

74. Id. ¶ C3.2.7.1.10, at 73.
75. See id. ¶ C3.2.5.8.1, at 71.
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Table A
States that have ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention77
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Anguilla
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Aruba
Bahamas
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize†
Bermuda
Botswana
British Virgin Islands
Bulgaria
Canada
Cayman Islands
China
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Djibouti (formerly Afars
and Issas)†
Egypt
Estonia
Falklands Islands
Fiji†
Finland
France (incl. French
Overseas Depts.)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

French Polynesia†
Germany
Gibraltar†
Greece
Guernsey
Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region
Hungary‡
Ireland
Isle of Man
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jersey
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)
Kuwait
Kiribati (formerly Gilbert Islands and
Central and Southern Line Islands) †
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macau Special Administrative Region
Malawi
Mexico
Montserrat
Netherlands
Nevis†
Norway

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Pakistan
Pitcairn
Poland
Portugal
Romania‡
Russian Federation
St. Christopher (Kitts)
St. Helena and Dependencies
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines†
San Marino
Seychelles
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands†
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Turks and Caicos Islands
Tuvalu (formerly Ellice Islands) †
Ukraine
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
• United States (incl. Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands)
• Venezuela
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77. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, accompanying materials (listing parties to Convention and declarations of Contracting States).
†
See U.S. Dep’t of State flyer, Hague Convention on the Serv. Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil
and Comm. Matters <http://travel.state.gov/law/hague_service.html> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004). The list assumes the
Convention remains in force in countries that have achieved independence after it was extended to them, including Belize,
Djibouti, Fiji, Kiribati, Nevis, St. Christopher, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. See id.
‡
See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status Table: Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters <http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=
conventions.status&cid=17#nonmem> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004) (noting recent accession of Hungary and Romania;
Convention enters into force in Hungary April 1, 2005).
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